In recent years, an important number of impact studies have attempted to examine the effect of credit on income poverty; however, many of these studies have not paid sufficient attention to the problems of endogeneity and selection bias. The few exceptional cases have employed econometric techniques that work at the village level. The problem is that the concept of village is inappropriate in the urban context where a large percentage of microfinance organisations in the developing world actually operate. This paper presents an econometric approach which controls for endogeneity and self-selection using data from a quasi-experiment designed at the household level, and conducted in three urban settlements in the surroundings of the Metropolitan area of Mexico City. The paper provides an estimation of the impact of credit, employing different equivalence scales in order to measure the sensitivity of the poverty impact to the intra-household distribution of welfare. We find a link between poverty impacts and lending technology. Group-based lending programmes are more effective in reducing the poverty gap but in doing so, they achieve insignificant impacts on the poverty incidence. By contrast, individual lending programmes reported significant and small impacts at the upper limits of deprivation but insignificant impacts on the poverty gap.
Introduction
The role of credit in the process of economic development and poverty reduction is an issue of ongoing debate. In the past, it was common for the state to intervene in those "strategic sectors" that had difficulty in accessing capital, assuming a trickle-down effect that would ultimately benefit the poor. In this spirit, many state-banking institutions, were established in many developing countries in the middle 1940s and early 1950s under quasi-Keynesian principles of financial repression designed to enhance investment (referred to by Vogel and Adams (1997) as the direct credit paradigm); but this approach has been heavily criticised by the Ohio School 1 for aggravating inefficiencies in the financial sector and deepening the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection.
Since the late 1970s and early 1980s, a set of innovations 2 known today as microfinance were developed by institutions such as the Bangladeshi Grameen Bank, the Unit Desa System of the Bank Rakyat in Indonesia and the Bolivian BancoSol that made possible for institutional lenders to reduce informational costs related to the screening, incentive and enforcement problems, and for the poor to access institutional financing. Although microfinance institutions have become the preferable subsidy-recipients seen as more effective channels to reach the poor, the hypothesis that they have impacts on poverty reduction has not been adequately tested in most of the cases, particularly in the urban context, with a few exceptions in rural credit markets, e.g. Hulme and Mosley (1996) ; Khandker (1998a and 1998b) , and Coleman (1999) , see also the review by Morduch and Haley (2002) . This paper presents an econometric approach that control for the problems of endogeneity and self-selection using data from a quasi-experiment designed at the household level and in the urban context. Our methodology also allows the evaluation of potential differences between group lending and individual lending technology regarding poverty impacts, particularly when the cost of borrowing is included in the analysis. The paper is divided as follows: Section 1 briefly presents the research design and the selected case-study organisations before discussing, in section 2 the econometric estimation procedure. Section 3 examines the effects of programme participation on households' income whereas section 4 presents the findings regarding poverty impacts. Section 5 concludes.
Research design
In order to collect primary data, we designed a type of quasi-experiment that is often referred to as a non-equivalent, post test-only quasi-experiment (Campbell and Stanley 1966) , in which two groups of households were interviewed: treatment and control. A major problem that emerges with the non-equivalent, post test only quasi-experiment, referred hereafter as simply quasi-experiment, is that the two groups, treatment and control, may differ in important ways that influence the decision of borrowing and thus, the outcome of interest. In other words, there might be unobservable factors related to e.g. individual efforts, abilities, preferences and attitudes towards risk that could affect the internal validity of the study.
In order to reduce potential selection problems, households who had selfselected to participate in a credit programme and had been accepted by the lender and therefore were actively participating in the credit programme were eligible to be sampled as treatment group. Participants with loans in arrears were also included in the group in order to strengthen the internal validity. Similarly, households who had self-selected to participate in a credit programme and had been accepted by the lender, but had not received a loan by the time the quasi-experiment was conducted, were eligible to be sampled as the control group.
Additionally, we followed a geographical criterion, consisting in operationalising the quasi-experiment amongst households living in the same settlement, in areas with a minimum level of socio-economic and cultural homogeneity, in order to hold constant factors such as infrastructure, cost of inputs and local prices 3 .
The quasi-experiment was conducted amongst 148 households living in three urban settlements in the surroundings of the Metropolitan area of Mexico City, where three case-study organisations operate: 1) Servicios Financieros Comunitarios (FINCOMUN); 2) Centro de Apoyo al Microempresario (CAME), and 3) Programas para la Mujer Mexico (PROMUJER). In this sense, we had tree locations, one for each case-study organisations.
The case-study organisations
The first case-study organisation is Fincomun. The organisation operates in San Miguel Teotongo, a neighbourhood with 80,000 inhabitants located in the Iztapalapa District, to the eastern periphery of Mexico City, one of poorest of the metropolitan area. Unlike most of the microfinance organisations in the country, Fincomun heavily relies on individual lending. By the end of 2004, after 10 years of operation, the organisation had almost 26 thousand borrowers (60% were women), with a loan portfolio of around 170 million pesos (17 million US dollars). The number of active borrowers, and the loan portfolio increased at an impressive rate of 302% and 256%, respectively in the period 1994-2004, where the portfolio at risk for more than 30 days was in the order of 4.98%.
The second organisation under study is CAME. It mainly operates in the Chalco Valley, one of the most densely populated municipalities in the country with about 324 thousand inhabitants. The Chalco Valley is located to the eastern 3 For a copy of the instruments of data collection, contact me at: m.nino@sheffield.ac.uk periphery of the Metropolitan area of Mexico City and remains as one of the poorest in the region. CAME began operations in 1993 employing the methodology of village banks. By the end of 2003, CAME had more than 40,000 active members, grouped in 1,600 income-generating groups or village banks.
Women integrated 80% of these groups. Compulsory savings range from 10% to 12% depending on the loan size, and have grown at an annual average rate of 98% from 1995 to 2003, amounting more than 138 million pesos by the end of period. Deposits represented 2.38 times the loan portfolio that resulted in a loan-to-savings ratio of 42%.
Finally, the third organisation under examination is Promujer. This organisation mainly operates in Tula City and the surrounding areas in the State of Hidalgo, one of the poorest in the country. About 90,000 inhabitants live in Tula city, which is located at the centre of the country, two hours from Mexico City.
Promujer employs the methodology of communal banks that combines group lending and training as the main services provided. In first quarter of 2004, the organisation reported 7,300 active borrowers with a loan portfolio that averaged 7.8 million pesos. Only women can participate in the credit programme, which reported a portfolio at risk for more than 30 days in the order of only 0.6%.
The econometric estimation procedure
To begin with, our exposition considers the case where household i decides to participate in a credit programme in order to finance any specific productive activity. The amount of capital supplied is exogenously determined by the lender L, who set up this maximum threshold according to level of participation in the programme. The lender is expected to exploit several screening, incentive and enforcement devices to deal with the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection that are related to borrowers' behaviour (Akerlof 1970; Besley and Coate 1995; Hoff and Stiglitz 1990) . Some of these devices are, inter alia, progressive lending, compulsory savings schemes, periodical repayment schedules, and so on.
Given the particular environment in underdeveloped financial markets, the demand for credit is assumed to be rationed by the lender (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981), and endogenously determined by household characteristics such as the stock of human capital, individual preferences and attitude towards risks. Our primary concern is to estimate the effect of credit on the outcome to be investigated , which is observed through the income variable. We consider the following model: Figure 1 . The decision process for programme selectivity. Adapted from Maddala (1999) A problem emerges here when we cannot observe households who choose either to participate or not, and households who are either accepted or rejected by credit officers or group members, i.e. 
In another paper, Maddala (1977) derives the covariance matrix as follows:
Cov (u ,u ,ε ) ⎟ ⎟ that enables us to evaluate the impact of programme participation on the outcome of interest, by comparing the expected outcome for treatment and control groups. Notice that both groups are participants with a time-variance difference that accounts for the length of membership. Consequently, control groups are integrated by households who just joined the credit programme. We follow the specification:
and . Under self-selectivity, , therefore equation (9) will report greater coefficients. In other words, households with comparative advantages will benefit more from the credit programme than disadvantaged households.
However, since we surveyed households that satisfied the condition , we believe to have considerably reduced the selection problem. 
Selecting the instrumental variable
In order to select the instrumental variable, we analysed instruments used by other researchers. Pitt and Khandker (1998a) however, the concept of village is in itself inappropriate in the urban context, where poor settlements are highly populated.
Given the presence of credit rationing in the market, it is reasonable to assume that the level of programme participation, i I , is exogenously determined by the lender, i.e. microfinance organisations require a set of minimum requirements to participate in the programme. Thus, we decided to concentrate on the supply side in order to identify the instrument i Z .
In the beginning we considered an observable variable with computational values that varied from household to household and which reflected the heterogeneity of the cost of borrowing. We computed this variable by estimating the cost of transportation per credit cycle , in which we capture the physical and geographical characteristics of the accessibility to the branch, in addition to the opportunity cost of borrowing , as a proxy of the income forgone for attending weekly meetings and other activities.
We transformed this variable into logarithmic form, in order to test for the underlined assumptions of no correlation between the identifying instrument and the income variable as follows:
6 The authors used a weighted exogenous sampling maximum likelihood-limited information maximum likelihood-fixed effects (WESML-LIML-FE) approach.
We found that, in the case of Fincomun, the coefficient γ of
LGCOSTBORROWPC rejected the null 0 : H 0 γ = at 5% level of significance (see table 1 ), throwing out any possibility of using this variable as the identifying instrument in the impact estimation for the three institutions participants in the study as a whole 7 . However, this variable gives us important information regarding the elasticity of demand for credit in relation to the cost of borrowing.
For example, a one percent change in the cost of borrowing gives rise to a 1.574 percent change in the amount of credit demanded from borrowers at Fincomun, ceteris paribus, and this elasticity was in the order of 1.705 and 1.458 for participants at CAME and Promujer, respectively. We found that these elasticities are correlated with the level of households' earnings. This is simply because those households with better business opportunities and higher expected returns also absorb a higher opportunity cost of borrowing, particularly when screening and enforcement devices such as periodical repayment schedules, exploited by group lending programmes, 7 We tested the 0 γ ≠ condition in (11) and (12) by computing a heteroskedasticity-robust t statistic after OLS estimation.
are very time-intensive.
The problem is that in fragmented credit markets, where the immediate option is the moneylender, borrowers may decide to remain in the programme in order to take advantage of progressive lending and borrow the maximum amount of capital available in order to minimise these costs. This behaviour may continue as long as the percentage change in the loan size is larger than the percentage change in earnings, i.e. progressive lending is available, and the credit market remains monopolistically concentrated. We discuss this issue regarding poverty impacts in sections 4 and 5.
In order to derive the identifying instrument, we tried to exploit the first component of LGCOSTBORROWPC, i.e. the logarithm of the cost of transportation per credit cycle, lo , (referred here as LGCOSTRANSPC). Our argument here relies on the idea that there is a correlation between programme participation and accessibility to the branch but we do not see how this instrument may affect the income variable. We assume that the correlation between and
I emerges from two sources:
First, microfinance organisations may decide to set up lending restrictions to households living a considerable distance from the branch due to the transaction costs implicitly related to the monitoring and enforcement processes. Regarding this particular issue, the Managing Director of Fincomun stated in an interview that a fundamental criterion for the organisation was to operate in a geographical radius that did not exceed a journey of 30 minutes walking or by public transport from the branch to the house of the applicant 8 .
Second, we should expect, as mentioned earlier, a process involving individual choice where households reporting high transaction and opportunity costs of participation would either have high incentives to borrow the largest amount of capital accessible in order to compensate these costs or may simply decide drop out or not to participate in the first place.
Our survey collected information on the cost of transportation per week given the periodicity of the group meetings; however there were a substantial number of missing values in the dataset that reflected the individual choice of walking to the branches rather than using public transport (see table 2 ). Since several programme participants walk to attend periodical meetings, we decided to explore the attributes of the time dimension that captured the information about the distance from the residence (or businesses) of the programme participant to the branch, as a proxy of accessibility, in substitution of . log Our survey collected information on the time (in minutes) that participants spent since they left home (or business) until they arrived at the branch. This variable was weighted when public transport was used in order to add the time that they would have consumed if they had walked to the branch. We coded this identifying instrument as DISTANCE. (coded in the regression equation as MILLS). As discussed above, we conducted the quasi-experiment in a way to reduce the problem of self-selectivity;
however, we needed to test the hypothesis of no selection problem. The results accepted the null of no self-selectivity, confirming that we followed an appropriate methodological procedure during the data collection. On the other hand, the Heckit procedure allows us to test for the quality of the identification variable, and provides us with important information about the robustness of the estimation. In order to do so, the identifying instrument DISTANCE was included in (12) alongside with the other exogenous variables, including the inverse Mills ratio. The identification is achieved by exploiting the properties of the inverse Mills ratio that result from the non-linear relationship of the exogenous variables in the reduced form equation (11). The coefficients and significance levels of LGMAXCREDIT and MILLS are reported in Table 4 .
After running the identification equation, the coefficients of the endogenous explanatory variable in the estimation equations as well as the Mills ratio for each organisation under study remained stable. The consistency of the results confirms the robustness of DISTANCE as the instrumental variable in our estimation.
Results from the second-stage Heckit estimation: the impact of programme participation on households income
We now turn to the results from the estimation of the impact of programme participation on households' income presented in table 6. We have estimated in (12) by employing the logarithm of income per capita and three different definitions of income per adult equivalent as the dependent variable. The use of adult equivalence scales is generally justified given the fact that children normally have lower consumption expenditure than adults and therefore they should be given a lesser weight. Some studies (e.g. Drèze and Srinivasan 1997) suggest that additional adults should be weighted less than the first adult after taking into account economies of scale.
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Poverty rates can be sensitive to equivalence scales and thus, alter the conclusions reached on the impact of microfinance on poverty reduction. In this sense, it becomes important to look at this particular issue. There have been recent attempts to attach weights to the distribution of wealth in developing countries by assigning adult equivalencies to household members according to their age and sex [e.g. May, Carter and Posel (1995) in South Africa and Hentschel and Lanjouw (1995) in Ecuador]; however, given the lack of a general consensus regarding the use of equivalence factors in the context of Mexico, we decided to follow the approach adopted by Rothbarth (1943) .
The equivalence factor takes the form , where is the equivalence factor for household h, is the number of adults (from age 18 to 65) and is the number of children in household h. The parameter θ is equal to 1 and Ф has different values corresponding to the age and sex of every child.
In we will refer to this measurement as equivalence factor 1 (IAE1).
We also include in our estimations other equivalence factors in order to conduct a sensitivity analysis. We follow, therefore, the adult equivalence scales developed by Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (1998) where it is given the parameters Ф and θ a value equal to 0.75 and children are defined as those aged less than 14 years. We refer to this measurement as equivalent factor 2 (IAE2).
Additionally we employ the OECD modified equivalence scale based on Hagenarrs et al, (1998) which weights the first adult with 1, additional adults with 0.5 and children aged 14 and less with a weight of 0.3. In our analysis we refer to this product as the income per adult equivalent 3 (IAE3). For comparative purposes, we have also included income per capita as another proxy of distribution of household wealth.
As we were expecting, after taking into account distributional factors, the level of individual welfare was affected by equivalent factors, with income per capita being the measurement that most over-stated the level of deprivation (see table   5 ). For analytical purposes, we focus on the income per adult equivalent 1. Equation 12): Logarithm of the maximum amount of credit borrowed (LGMAXCREDIT) † Robust t statistics in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% † The Heckman procedure transforms LGMAXCREDIT into a dummy variable for treatment group = 1 if I i > 0 a/ Income per adult equivalent 1 follows the approach developed by Rothbarth (1943) , and it has been used by the Mexican government to identify poverty lines at national level. b/ Income per adult equivalent 2 follows the approach developed by Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (1998). c/ Income per adult equivalent 3 follows the OECD modified equivalence scale based on the work of Hagenarrs et. al (1998) .
For example, if we estimate the antilog of δ when the logarithm of monthly income per adult equivalent 1 was derived as the dependent variable we obtain , suggesting that ceteris paribus, the median income per adult equivalent of treatment households with at least one year of programme participation at Fincomun was higher than that of the control groups by about 73%.
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We observed nevertheless a degree of variability in the coefficient of i I when different definitions of income per adult equivalent were introduced, suggesting that the impact analysis of microfinance might be sensitive to intrahousehold distribution of welfare. Surprisingly, the parameter estimate δ in the regression equation was positive but not significantly different from zero in the case of CAME and Promujer. In other words, although we were expecting a positive effect of programme participation on the level of individual welfare, there was no evidence to confirm this relationship. The starting point in examining the reasons of the insignificant levels of δ was to see the degree to which it might be related to the severity of deprivation amongst households' participants.
In fact, some researchers have found that very poor borrowers are more likely to report low income impacts not only because they are engaged in low-return self-employment activities (Hulme and Mosley 1996; Husain 1998; Zaman 1998;  Wood and Shariff 1997) 9 , but also because the process of decision making under uncertainty is driven by risk-averse behaviour, particularly at low levels of income (Ravallion 1988; Sinha and Lipton 1999) . The problem is that the estimation procedure provides us with information on the impact of programme participation at the mean of the dependent variable; however, it does not tell us to what extent those participants are actually poor.
Furthermore, notice that the parameter δ measures the average impact of programme participation on ; however, it does not take into consideration the effect of borrowing over time.
i Y Treatment households with say five years of membership are expected to report a greater impact than those households with just one or two years of membership. This is in part due to the effect of progressive lending that continuously increases the credit limit of borrowers. In order to address the latter issue we extend the Heckman procedure to a Tobit selection equation in section 3.1, before we concentrate in section 4 on examining the impacts on poverty reduction.
Substituting the Heckit procedure for a Tobit selection equation: the impact of borrowing on households' income
We replaced the treatment dichotomous variable i I in equation (11) 
where
(for treatment group) (15) 
which generates three conditional mean functions 12 : one of the latent variable , which can be used to understand the unobservable factors (e.g. individual preferences, attitudes towards risk or entrepreneurship) that affect the propensity to borrow from microfinance organisations; one of the observed dependent variable , which can be used to understand the determinants of the level of borrowing by treatment and control groups alike; and one of the uncensored observed dependent variable
C C > , which can be used to 10 Since we have a data-censoring case demanding the variable to follow a homoskedastic normal distribution, we use a logarithmic transformation in our estimation strategy to make this assumption more reasonable. Goldberger (1972) and Greene (1981) have proved that the ratio of the OLS estimates to the maximum likelihood estimates get close to the proportion of data uncensored. 12 For further details on the derivation of the conditional mean functions, see Greene (2003) . understand the determinants of the level of borrowing by treatment households alone.
We are particularly interested in looking at the conditional mean function of the observed dependent variable that is censored at zero for control groups, and have disturbances normally distributed. In other words, we are interested in examining the observed factors that affect the level of household borrowing between treatment and control groups.
i C
We can estimate now a credit function for the level of programme participation, which is determined by the marginal effects of the independent variables on the maximum amount of capital borrowed during the last credit cycle, as follows:
where i X is a 1 x K vector of household characteristics; i Z is a set of observable variables distinct from those in i X that affect but not the outcome of interest conditional on that plays the role of the identifying instruments; is a vector of financial market characteristics;
α , c β , γ and c θ are the intercept and the unknown parameters, respectively whereas is the error term that captures unmeasured household characteristics that determine borrowing levels. 
where y α , y β , y θ and δ are the intercept and the unknown parameters respectively, whilst is the error term reflecting unmeasured determinants of that vary from household to household. Given that we are including as the explanatory variable in (23), we may expect some level of endogeneity emerging now from the lenders' policy-specifics that affect the upper limit of credit available and not only the accessibility to it, as discussed earlier when the Heckman procedure was estimated. When we estimated equation (22) 7 ). We also followed Klein's rule of thumb (1961) Robust t statistics in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% a/ Income per adult equivalent 1 follows the approach developed by Rothbarth (1943) , and it has been used by the Mexican government to identify poverty lines at national and local level. b/ Income per adult equivalent 2 follows the approach developed by Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (1998) . c/ Income per adult equivalent 3 follows the OECD modified equivalence scale based on the work of Hagenarrs et. al, (1998). Notice that the predicted residuals from the second-stage Tobit selection equation report statistically insignificant levels in the parameter estimates υ , confirming, as in the Heckit procedure, the assumption of no selectivity 13 . It is possible to argue thus that the decision process that involves increasing levels of borrowing is largely a function of the policy-specifics that are exogenously determined, and linearly correlated to progressive lending (captured by the length of membership).
The parameter estimate δ of the impact variable, , reported a positive sign for each of the three microfinance organisations; however, the coefficients were only significantly different from zero in the case of Fincomun. More precisely, the econometric results suggest that if the maximum amount of capital borrowed by treatment households had gone up by x%, the income per adult equivalent 1 had increased in the order of 0.064x% relative to the control group, ceteris paribus. This result is important for two reasons: However, we could expect that an absolute change in the level of income, deriving from a proportional change in earnings relative to a change in the maximum amount of capital borrowed is heavily dependent on the level of 13 The Hausman test also imposed the assumption of exogeneity, by no rejecting the null of no systematic difference between the covariance matrixes of the OLS and the 2S-Tobit estimators:
0.24 in the case of Fincomun; 2 (13) χ = 2 (13) χ = 0.13 in the case of CAME, and 2.11 in the case of Promujer. initial welfare. In other words, if we are interested in examining poverty impacts, we should expect larger effects from credit amongst those households who are better off. We examine this particular issue in section 4 by looking at the relationship between the severity of deprivation and poverty impacts from the case-study organisations.
The impact of credit on poverty reduction
To begin the discussion, we proceed to calculate the incidence of poverty and poverty gap amongst households' members by computing four different monetary thresholds of income deprivation:
Poverty line 1 (PL1). It measures the incidence of extreme poverty, and has been calculated at 784.5 pesos per month.
Poverty line 2 (PL2). It measures the incidence of poverty, and has been computed at 1507.5 pesos per month.
Poverty line 3 (PL3). It measures the incidence of moderate poverty and has been calculated at 1881 pesos per month World Bank's poverty line, which is fixed at US$ 2 a day The use of several critical thresholds of human deprivation is justified for two reasons: firstly, there is a widespread recognition that the conventional relative poverty line of US $2 a day is too low for the existing domestic prices in the country. Secondly, by computing several poverty lines we were able to analyse how deep the case-study organisations were reaching the poor, and to measure the magnitude of the poverty impacts by levels of deprivation.
We followed the Sedesol (2002) 225 159 7 0 0 0 The statistically significant association in the cross-tabulations are indicated by the Chi-square values for the cell as a whole at 0.001 (*); 0.01 (**); 0.05 (***); and 0.1 (****) levels of significance. c/ Poverty lines are derived in prices of 2004 , following Sedesol (2002 We observed a larger incidence of poverty amongst treatment households at CAME and Promujer than at Fincomun when PL2 and PL3 were employed. For example, although 43% and 39% of treatment households at CAME and Promujer, respectively, reported earnings that were below the minimum requirement to satisfy their basic needs according to the PL2, in comparison to 28% at Fincomun, only in the case of Fincomun we found a statistically significant association at 0.05 level between treatment and control groups in relation to the incidence of poverty. More precisely, the empirical evidence may suggest a significant relationship between programme participation and poverty reduction. Unfortunately we did not collect panel data to confirm this relationship. What we can say, however, is that the case-study organisations were reaching the poor at different levels of deprivation. To illustrate this, take the case of the depth of deprivation amongst poor borrowers (see also figure 2). The computed poverty gap was larger amongst participants at Fincomun than at CAME and Promujer. Poor borrowers at Fincomun had to cover, on average, an income shortfall of 545 pesos per month in order to cross the PL2, whereas poor borrowers at CAME and Promujer had to cover only 304 and 319 pesos, respectively. As suggested before, we might have the case here where some organisations (e.g. Fincomun) are more effective at reducing the number of poor households but only by lifting those who were closest to the poverty line, with low impacts on the poverty gap. Other organisations (e.g. CAME and Promujer) might be more effective in reaching the extreme poor but by doing so, they report low insignificant effects on the overall incidence, bringing the extreme poor closer to the poverty line. One way to find out whether our assumptions are correct is by estimating the marginal effects of borrowing across the poverty lines. In order to do so, we ran a Probit estimation equation in the form Robust z statistics in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% a/ Income per adult equivalent 1 (IAE1) follows Rothbarth (1943) Note: Equation (25) could not be estimated neither using the World Bank's poverty line nor the Poverty line 1, due to the fact that we did not observe treatment households at CAME, and control groups at Promujer whose income was below the thresholds of extreme deprivation. The immediate consequence of that was to face a typical case of perfect predict probability.
As we were expecting, the slope coefficient of reported negative signs when POORPL2 and POORPL3 were included as dependent variables, but they only showed statistically significant levels when we estimated the Probit equation
for programme participants at Fincomun. Other things held constant, the effect of a relative change of x% in the level of borrowing by poor members at
Fincomun was a decline in the probability of staying below that poverty line of about -0.038x%, and the magnitude of this impact was marginally greater (-0.043x%) when POORPL2 was replaced for POORPL3 in the estimation.
i C
Although the parameter δ reported negative signs when the extreme poor was included in the estimation (e.g. POORPL1 and POOR2US), it was not significantly different from zero. In other words, we could not find statistical evidence to confirm a poverty impact from Fincomun at the lowest point of deprivation, where the extreme poor were grouped. This might confirm our hypothesis with regard to the idea that some lenders are more effective at having poverty impacts but just at the upper limits of deprivation, where they can take those who are closest to the poverty line out of poverty.
Interestingly, Promujer reported positive signs and statistically significant levels in the slope coefficient of when POORPL1 was computed as dependent variable. This suggests that, other things held constant, a relative change in the loan size of an extreme poor woman borrowing from Promujer will increase the probability of staying poor. The fact that the slope coefficient of reported negative but insignificant levels when POORPL2 and POORPL3 were included in the estimation, suggests that Promujer might be effective in reaching the extreme poor but by doing so, the organisation is reporting impacts just on the poverty gap and not on the overall incidence, which may also explain the considerably smaller poverty gap reported by the organisation compared to that of Fincomun (see table 9) . Surprisingly, although the slope coefficient of showed negative signs, we could not find any statistical significance to confirm poverty impacts from CAME at the estimated thresholds of deprivation.
Concluding remarks
Our findings revealed that microfinance organisations reach the poor at different levels of deprivation; however, although reaching the poor has its own merits, it does not necessarily lead to poverty reduction: only one organisation (Fincomun) reported statistically significant, although very small poverty impacts at the upper limits of the poverty line where the moderate poor is located, suggesting a strong relationship between the level initial welfare and the magnitude of the poverty impact. Furthermore, those organisations that rely the financial operation on group lending technology (CAME and Promujer) appeared to be more effective in reducing the poverty gap but by doing so, they report insignificant impacts on the overall incidence.
The empirical evidence also points to a linkage between the insignificance of the poverty impacts and lending technology. The link can be tracked to some devices that microfinance organisations have traditionally employed to deal with the screening, monitoring and enforcement problems. In particular, we refer to the costs that periodical repayment schedules, which demand weekly compulsory meetings, generate to programme participants. As discussed earlier in section 2.2, we found an elastic responsiveness in the demand for credit as a result of a percentage increase in the opportunity cost of borrowing. In fact, borrowers at CAME reported the largest elasticity between the three organisations. This reflects the direct effect that weekly compulsory meetings have on income, in particular when households economically more dynamic, and closer to the poverty line, are forced to forego earnings for being required to attend sessions that often last for several hours.
To illustrate this, we estimated the opportunity cost of borrowing per credit cycle. After computing this cost on monthly basis, the data reveals that it represented about 21% of the poverty gap that poor households borrowing from CAME had to cover to cross the poverty line 2, relative to the 10% of the poverty gap that borrowers at Fincomun had to cover. These results have important policy implications. Rigid screening and monitoring devices such as periodical repayment schedules can increase the utility cost of borrowing to such a level that the efforts of poverty reduction can be undermined. In this sense, institutional efforts aimed to reduce these costs can have significant effects. However, more research is needed to examine in more detail the linkage between lending technology and poverty impacts. 
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